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There seems to be an irreconcilable gap between the
Dutch state and its Muslim inhabitants. This impres-
sion is transforming into an increasingly popular
standpoint, not only in politics and the media but
also among legal philosophers, historians, and ju-
rists. As t h e mantra that supports the apparent gap,
what tends to be singled out is the principle of the
separation of church and state. This separation is al-
legedly alien to Islam, and therefore Islam is irrecon-
cilable with the idea of a constitutional state. The
mantra appears to be a common-knowledge fact, for
which reason any substantiation and explanations
are casually dropped out, but wrongfully so. 
Church and State 
in Multicultural Society 
The state under the rule of law and the prin-
ciple of the separation of church and state
are not unambiguous concepts. The rele-
vance and scope of the principle is unclear;
moreover, a fair question can be raised as to
whether this liberal principle is even prob-
lematic at all in relation to Muslims in the
N e t h e r l a n d s .
The foundations of the state under the
rule of law are the principles of legality, sep-
aration of powers, civil rights, and judicial
control. Individual freedom is most impor-
tant. The individual determines his or her
own human vision and there is no dominant
reality. Given that the government can
never prescribe what 'real' freedom is, it
should keep its distance.
Historically, individual conscience be-
came recognized as absolute freedom to
put an end to the claims of absolutistic
theocratic monarchs. As a result, religious
freedom became a fact. By eliminating the
privileged position of the ruling church(es),
church and state were in fact separated. This
was enhanced by all the subjects' simulta-
neous claim to fundamental civil rights. In
the Netherlands, the actual separation of
church and state was completed in the
process starting in 1917, which led to the
pillar system in which pluralistic (religious)
views found a place for themselves. The
state has known no religious ideology ever
since; its worldview became neutral. But are
the prayer in this year's queen's address, the
edge inscription of the euro reading that
God is with us, and the reference to the
Almighty at the beginning of our laws mere
subtleties? The fact that the Netherlands
works within the European Union with
countries that give different content to this
important principle (England, Norway,
Greece) is often conveniently 'forgotten' in
domestic political discourse.
Separation and the Muslim
p r e s e n c e
After 11 September 2001, the presence of
about 860,000 Muslims in the Netherlands
has been increasingly perceived as a prob-
lem. People do not talk these days about
'Muslims', they talk about 'Islam' Ð as if it
were a national organization. The image of
church and state does not fit the mosque, as
religious variation is large and there is a di-
versity of interpretations and views.
When is the principle of the separation of
church and state relevant today? In the first
place, when the government singles out cer-
tain religions (whereas Islam as an ideologi-
cal concept is not presently singled out by
the Dutch government). Moreover, there are
no Islamic parties at a national or local level
with political power to favour 'Islam' over
other ideologies. The situation in which only
associations with a Christian orientation are
eligible for subsidies, as was occasionally the
case in municipalities controlled by Dutch
Reformed parties in the 1980s, has no Islam-
ic equivalent. On the contrary, and in conflict
with the law, the mantra of the separation of
church and state is in fact used as legitima-
tion to prevent subsidizing Islamic prayer fa-
cilities and schools.1 Second, the liberal prin-
ciple becomes relevant when 'Islam' can
exert political influence. This does not seem
to be the case either. Again, there is no uni-
fied national Islamic organization, while the
differences between and within Muslim
(sub)groups is considerable. Muslims have
organized themselves along diverse cultural,
religious, and ethnic lines, and these seldom
comprise political aspirations.
To illustrate the relevance of the principle
of the separation of church and state in rela-
tion to different ideological trends, we
should take a look at the Protestant SGP
(State Reformed Party). This party aims
specifically at a Dutch government based
entirely 'on the divine order revealed in the
Holy Scriptures'. This standpoint produces
in fact a theocratic party with official status
within Dutch polity that elevates not the
principle of popular sovereignty but a 'gov-
ernment by God'. It excludes women from
having certain voting rights because of an
alleged conflict with what a woman's 'call-
ing' is. In September 2001, the UN Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women called for legal measures
against this discrimination. Still, the govern-
ment persists since 1991 in its view that dis-
crimination against women should be
weighed against other rights pertaining to
the foundations of the Dutch legal system Ð
freedom to gather, religious freedom, and
free speech. A prohibition can only be set
when there is a 'systematic, very severe dis-
turbance of the democratic process'.
This is somewhat surprising in light of the
prohibition declaration by the highest Turk-
ish judge of the Turkish Welfare Party,
whose judgment is maintained by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. The focus of
the activities of the Welfare Party is sup-
posed to be the elimination of the separa-
tion of church and state.2
If the Dutch criterion of a 'very serious dis-
turbance of the democratic process' does
not work for the SGP, for which Islamic orga-
nization could it possibly work? The link in
public debates between wearing head-
scarves or the nonsensical remarks of some
imams (e.g. on homosexuality) and the sep-
aration of church and state lacks credibility
and is inconsequent.
None of this means that Islamic religious
diversity resulting from the arrival of immi-
grants, refugees, and converts does not pre-
sent the government with problems. The
discussion over issues like wearing head-
scarves in school, at work, or even in court is
not primarily about the separation of
church and state but about basic civil rights.
In these considerations, meanings for Mus-
lims and non-Muslims are often diametrical-
ly opposed. For instance, non-Muslims can-
not seem to accept that progressive views
can very well be combined with a strong de-
gree of religiosity, or that for some girls the
headscarf is a means to emancipation and
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .3 A forced secularization of
Muslims does, on the contrary, conflict with
the separation of church and state. After all,
giving preference to secularism equals
favouring ideological truths.
Foundations of citizenship
The real problem lies in the fact that the
Netherlands has no consequent policy re-
garding philosophies of life. All kinds of ar-
guments are thrown into the pile. The policy
or the approach is often a question of taste,
of understanding. The essence of a state
under the rule of law, particularly the pro-
tection of individual freedom, plays too
marginal a role. Behind every Muslim is an
individual: child or adult, man or woman,
traditional or progressive, ailing or healthy,
lonely, enthusiastic, expressive Ð you name
it. Giving space to the reality and truth of
that individual is important, and experience
has taught us that repressed identities are
more likely to develop into extremist vari-
ants. The uninvited construing of or empha-
sis on 'the' Islamic identity of Muslims in a
hostile (or friendly) environment is what
leads to a distancing from Dutch society.
This Islamic identity is confirmed as a reac-
tion to alienation and social exclusion.4 It is
this alienation that is threatening in the
long term. Many individuals Ð not only Mus-
lims Ð no longer feel at home in the Dutch
state, and feel unprotected against an indis-
criminate government. Dutch Muslims and
their children deserve the chance to make a
free choice in becoming citizens of the
Dutch democratic state, and the chance is
theirs for the taking.
The real question concerns what the foun-
dations should be of a Dutch citizenship
with an Islamic identity. The philosopher of
law Marlies Galenkamp points in this con-
text to the harm principle of the philoso-
pher J.S. Mill. The government can only in-
terfere with the freedom of the (Islamic) cit-
izen if s/he causes damage to other citizens.
On the basis of this principle, Muslims can
maintain their own religious views unless
they cause damage to others, including
those within their own community. A Mus-
lim may therefore not discriminate, because
that hurts others. A Muslim can step out of
the community if he disagrees with certain
views, such as female circumcision or forced
marriages. This comes closer to the perspec-
tive of individual freedom supported by the
foundations of the democratic state. Collec-
tive thinking is relegated in order to guaran-
tee the freedom of all citizens.
The essence of such a state is not to 'drill'
people, but to protect them against the om-
nipotence of the government. From this
principled choice for individual freedom,
Muslims must also be actively protected
against undesired interference by foreign
powers. Protective notions also call for alert-
ness when signing agreements with coun-
tries in which Islam is the state religion. One
should keep in mind that, under certain cir-
cumstances, foreign laws can also be ap-
plied to Muslim citizens in the Netherlands
on the basis of private international law.
A consequence of alienation is that, in
their isolation, Muslims try to solve their
own problems outside the law of the state.
Transparency is needed to guarantee the
freedom of Muslim citizens. For example, a
non-registered imam marriage can have
negative consequences, such as an increase
in polygamy. Muslims have to be protected
against alienation, because the state under
the rule of law is a guarantee and not a
threat. The state belongs to everyone. 
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